The Peter A. Allard School of Law

Allard Research Commons
Faculty Publications

Allard Faculty Publications

2020

The Deliberative Dimensions of Modern Environmental
Assessment Law
Jocelyn Stacey
Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia, stacey@allard.ubc.ca

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.allard.ubc.ca/fac_pubs
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, Indigenous, Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons, Public
Law and Legal Theory Commons, and the Rule of Law Commons

Citation Details
Jocelyn Stacey, "The Deliberative Dimensions of Modern Environmental Assessment Law" [forthcoming in
2020] 43:2 Dal LJ.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Allard Faculty Publications at Allard Research
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Allard
Research Commons.

(2020) 43:2 Dalhousie Law Journal forthcoming
The Deliberative Dimensions of Modern Environmental Assessment Law
Jocelyn Stacey*
Abstract
Environmental assessment (EA) is a cornerstone of environmental law. It provides a legal
framework for public decision making about major development projects with implications for
environmental protection and the rights and title of Indigenous peoples. Despite significant
literature supporting deliberation as the preferred mode of engagement with those affected by
EA decisions, the specific legal demands of EA legislation remain undeveloped. This article
suggests a legal foundation for deliberative environmental assessment. It argues that modern
environmental assessment can be understood through three public law frames: procedural
fairness, public inquiry, and framework for the duty to consult and accommodate. It further
argues that these three public law frames share features of deliberative decision making that
can and should inform the implementation and interpretation of new design features in British
Columbia and Canada’s reformed EA legislation.
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Introduction
Environmental assessment (“EA”) law provides the legal framework for deciding whether and
how controversial development projects proceed in light of their anticipated impacts on the
environment and constitutionally-protected Aboriginal and treaty rights. The social,
environmental and economic stakes of decisions about, e.g., pipelines, hydroelectric dams, or
heavy metal mines are identified, assessed, and adjudicated through EA law.
The stakes of most EA decisions are enormous. The enduring challenge of EA legislation is to
provide a framework that allows for these stakes to be assessed, understood, and addressed in
a democratically legitimate manner. Environmental law scholars have analogized EA to Magna
Carta1 for the environment and argued it is “quasi-constitutional” in nature because of the vital
role it plays in generating publicly justified decisions.2 EA scholarship, by and large, resolves this
challenge in favour of a deliberative model of EA;3 that is, a set of requirements that fosters
robust exchange and mutual learning amongst those affected by the project proposal (industry
proponents, government agencies, local communities, Indigenous nations, the public
generally).
The model of deliberative EA has not, however, translated to the implementation and
interpretation of Canadian EA legislation. Perhaps because of the unique, technical, and
complex structure of EA legislation, its deliberative potential remains unfulfilled. As explained
below, when decisions are judicially reviewed, the courts seem to understand EA legislation as
requiring a wholly technical process and/or generating a wholly political decision. Caselaw has
yet to elucidate the deliberative qualities latent in EA law, missing the connection between
deliberation and the rule of law and the potential for deliberation to better achieve EA’s
legislated objectives of sustainable decision making and environmental protection. In other
words, deliberative EA in the Canadian context is largely understood as an aspirational policy
goal. This understanding misses its essential Canadian public law context, namely, the duty of
fairness, public inquiries, and the duty to consult and accommodate Aboriginal peoples (“DCA”).
Recent legislative changes to EA provide a timely illustration of the need to elucidate the public
law dimensions of modern EA law. Both British Columbia and Canada have undertaken

1

Elizabeth Fisher, “Environmental impact assessment: ‘setting the law ablaze’” 422 at 422 and 426 (citing to
William Rodgers, “The Most Creative Moments in the History of US Environmental Law: “The Whats”” (2000) Univ
Illinois L Rev 1 at 31.
2
Jocelyn Stacey, “The Environmental, Democratic, and Rule-of-Law Implications of Harper’s Environmental
Assessment Legacy” (2016) 21 Rev Const Stud 165 [Stacey, “Legacy”].
3
See Part I.B. infra.
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significant law reform efforts to “revitalize”4 EA legislation and “restore public trust.”5 Both
governments have committed to implement the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), which contains an obligation on States to “consult with and
cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned … in order to obtain their free
and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories
and other resources.”6 In line with these commitments, BC and Canada’s reformed statutes
contain new design features: opportunities for early public involvement, the incorporation of
community knowledge, and a recognition of Indigenous jurisdiction, which, in BC, includes
consensus-seeking obligations on provincial officials. These are laudable developments. But
they increase the complexity of EA regimes, further compounding the risk that EA’s connections
to more familiar public law frames will remain obscured.
This article defends a legal foundation for deliberative EA. It argues that modern EA can be
understood through three public law frames: procedural fairness, public inquiry, and the
framework for the duty to consult and accommodate. These three frames demystify the
seemingly technical and complex characteristics of EA law by grounding them in three more
familiar aspects of Canadian public law. The article further argues that these three public law
frames share features of deliberative decision making that can and should inform the
implementation and interpretation of EA legislation. Through this analysis, the article identifies
the largely unexplored deliberative dimensions shared by the duty of fairness, public inquiry,
and the DCA. It shows how these public law frames contain essential conditions for
deliberation. The article argues that each frame – albeit implicitly and incompletely –
recognizes the responsible agency of those affected, fosters mutual respect through
participatory processes, and requires decision makers to be reflexive in their decisions. In other
words, each frame contains conditions that, when fulfilled, can generate publicly justified
decisions in accordance with the rule of law.
Before outlining the article’s structure, a caveat is in order about its approach to the DCA. The
DCA is a constitutional obligation that exists independently of EA law. Yet, as this article details,
EA law plays a significant role in implementing the DCA. Moreover, the Supreme Court of
Canada (SCC) has and continues to furnish the DCA with the contents of Canadian
administrative law, drawing on common law notions of participatory rights.7 The article’s
purpose is not to propose incremental reforms to the DCA, although that may be one effect.
Reforms to the DCA must address the concerns of Indigenous communities, scholars, and their
4

Environmental Assessment Revitalization Intentions Paper (Victoria: Government of British Columbia, 2018),
Government of British Columbia, online <https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/environment/natural-resourcestewardship/environmental-assessments/environmental-assessmentrevitalization/documents/ea_revitalization_intentions_paper.pdf> at 3 [BC Intentions Paper].
5
Minister of Environment and Climate Change Mandate Letter (12 Nov, 2015), Government of Canada, online:
<https://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-environment-and-climate-change-mandate-letter>.
6
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2 October 2007, U.N.G.A Res. A/RES/61/295 at
Article 32(2), subject to the limitations in Article 46. BC Intentions Paper, supra note 4 at 8.
7
Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73 at para 41 [Haida]; Beckman v. Little
Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC 53 at paras 46-47.
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allies who are clear that, as currently conceived and implemented, the DCA fails to meet
international norms and continues the project of colonization.8 This article takes an internal
approach to the DCA to show that it is an instance in which Canadian courts have actively
developed deliberative conditions within a Canadian public law framework, even if courts are
unwilling to give those conditions their full effect.
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the basic structure of EA law in BC and
Canada, identifying the legal challenge posed by existing judicial interpretation of EA legislation.
It then turns to the case for deliberative EA and explains why this theoretical framing enjoys
such support in the EA literature. Drawing from existing scholarship on the relationship
between law and deliberative democracy, it highlights three deliberative conditions that must
be in place for the law to support deliberative decision making: recognition of the responsible
agency of those affected, mutual respect, and reflexivity. Part II is the heart of the article. Part II
explains modern EA practice through each of these public law frames: (i) EA as procedural
fairness for the public, (ii) EA as public inquiry in miniature, and (iii) EA as statutory framework
for the DCA. Part II takes each of these public law frames and identifies within them the three
essential conditions for deliberative decision making. Part III of the article offers a brief example
of how a deliberative understanding of these three frames can elucidate a new feature in BC
and Canada’s reformed EA legislation. Using the planning phase/early engagement stage as an
example, it highlights how this reform blends and extends upon the three public law frames. It
then identifies how the three deliberative conditions can guide its implementation and
interpretation going forward.

I. Environmental Assessment Law and the Duty to Consult and
Accommodate in Canada
A. The Basics of EA and DCA
EA is a decision-making procedure that requires the identification, consideration, and
prevention of environmental harm before it happens. It has a planning function in that EA
involves the assessment of interconnected environmental issues as well as economic, social,
and cultural concerns. The SCC has described EA as “a planning tool that is now generally
regarded as an integral component of sound decision-making.”9 EA legislation is a central
8

Gordon Christie, “Developing Case Law: The Future of Consultation and Accommodation” (2006) 39 UBC L Rev
139; Robert Hamilton and Joshua Nichols, “The Tin Ear of the Court: Ktunaxa Nation and the Foundation of the
Duty to Consult” (2019) 56 Alta. Law Rev. 729 [Hamilton and Nichols]; Bruce McIvor, First Peoples Law: Essays on
Canadian Law and Decolonization, 3d ed (First Peoples Law, 2018) at 69-77; Erin Hanson, Coast Salish Law and
Jurisdiction over Natural Resources: A Case Study with the Tsleil-Waututh Nation (MA Thesis, University of British
Columbia, 2018) [unpublished]; Bryn Gray, “Building Relationships and Advancing Reconciliation through
Meaningful Consultation: Report to the Minister of Indigenous and Northern Affairs (30 May, 2016), online:
<https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1498765671013/1498765827601>.
9
Friends of the Oldman River Society v Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992] 1 SCR 3, 88 DLR (4th) 1 [Oldman] at
71.
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feature of Canadian environmental law. EAs are a legal prerequisite to government approval of
major development projects and are also used to inform policy formation and regional
development.10
In Canada, EA is one of the few sites in which the risks and benefits of a range of environmental
and social impacts inform public decision making in a manner that is transparent to the public.11
While the assessment of these risks and benefits can sometimes lead to project proposals being
rejected, the focus is typically on alterations, mitigation measures, and conditions that can
reduce unnecessary impacts and prevent some environmental harms while still allowing the
project to proceed.12 Once project proposals receive an EA approval they then must be
constructed, operated, and decommissioned in accordance with applicable regulatory regimes
(e.g. mining law, fisheries law).
The DCA is also an integral component of Crown decision making in Canada. The DCA flows
from the honour of the Crown, which requires that the Crown act honourably in all its dealings
with Indigenous peoples.13 As articulated by the SCC in Haida and subsequent decisions, the
DCA is engaged when the Crown contemplates action that may adversely impact Aboriginal or
treaty rights.14 Approving a development project by granting an EA permit is Crown conduct
that virtually always engages the DCA, given the geography of Canada, traditional and ongoing
land use and governance, and the interconnected nature of environmental impacts. As
explained in Part II.C. below, EA and the DCA have been intertwined in practice for some time.
The SCC has recognized that both EA and the DCA have a vital role in ensuring decisions are
made in the public interest. In Clyde River, the Court stated that “the duty to consult, being a
constitutional imperative, gives rise to a special public interest that supersedes other
concerns.”15 The Court has also identified environmental protection as a “public purpose of
superordinate importance”16 and that understanding the “consequences… from environmental
change are integral to decision-making.”17
EA is thus a crucial point for government decision makers to engage with individuals and
communities who will be affected by major development decisions. This engagement is
essential to making decisions about land, water, resources, etc. which comply with legislative
10

Though these latter EA tools are better developed elsewhere: see, e.g., Barry Dalal-Clayton and Barry Sadler,
Strategic Environmental Assessment: A Sourcebook and Reference Guide to International Experience (London:
Earthscan, 2005).
11
Stacey, “Legacy”, supra note 2 at 171; David Boyd, Unnatural Law (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003) at 233, 244-248.
12
Meinhard Doelle, The Federal Environmental Assessment Process – A Guide and Critique (Toronto: LexisNexis
Canada, 2008) at 25 (summarizing effective, efficient and fair EA).
13
Haida, supra note 7 at paras 16-17.
14
Ibid. at para 35; Clyde River (Hamlet) v Petroleum Geo-Services Inc., 2017 SCC 40 at paras 25, 29 [CR].
15
CR, supra note 14 at para 40 (citing to Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43
at para 70 [CS]).
16
R v Hydro-Québec, [1997] 3 SCR 213 at para 85. See also Ontario v Canadian Pacific Ltd, [1995] SCR 1031 at para
55.
17
Oldman, supra note 9 at 37.
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requirements in a formal sense and also have the qualities of democratic and legal authority.
Some have described EA as something like Magna Carta for the environmental context,
observing that “just like that document, it is an official statement of the principles of
governance, and accordingly it is an articulation of a good society.”18
Recent legislative reform to EA in BC and at the federal level enhance the obligations on
decision makers to engage meaningfully with those affected. For example, the reformed
legislation contains three design features which do not easily map onto pre-existing modes of
engagement. Both statutes contain a planning stage, which creates a process for engagement
to determine the process for the subsequent EA.19 Both statutes require inclusion of
community knowledge,20 blurring the lines between process and substance and citizen and
expert. Both statutes recognize Indigenous jurisdiction21 and BC’s legislation recognizes a
consensus-seeking obligation on the Agency and Ministers who implement the Act.22
These are all laudable reforms with the potential to significantly improve or rectify failures of
their predecessors.23 The challenge, from a legal perspective, is that the specific legal contours
of EA’s requirements for engaging with those affected are undeveloped. Despite extensively
detailed legislation setting out EA requirements and standards, the dominant judicial
characterization of EA decisions is as either “essentially political in nature”24 or as scientific
exercises not subject to review by the court.25 Despite judicial assurances that fair procedure is
the “handmaiden of justice,”26 Canadian courts have been reluctant to supervise the
implementation of statutory EA procedures in a way that furthers access to justice objectives of
EA legislation.27
18

Supra, note 1.
The “planning phase” at the federal level: Impact Assessment Act, SC2019, c 28, ss 10-15 [IAA]. Early
engagement under the BC legislation: Environmental Assessment Act, SBC2018, c 51, ss 13-18 [EAA].
20
IAA, supra note 19, ss 6((1)(j), 22(1)(m); EAA, supra note 19, s 2(a).
21
IAA, supra note 19, s 2; EAA, supra note 19, s 2(1)(ii)(b).
22
EAA, supra note 19, ss 16(1), 19(1), 27(5), 28(3), 29(3).
23
For critique of the past iteration of federal EA see, e.g., Meinhard Doelle, “CEAA 2012: The End of Federal EA as
We Know it?” (2012) 24 J Envtl L & Prac 1; Robert B Gibson, “In Full Retreat: The Canadian Government’s New
Environmental Assessment Law Undoes Decades of Progress” (2012) 30:3 Impact Assessment and Project
Appraisal 179.
24
Peace Valley Landowner Assn. v British Columbia (Minister of Environment) 2016 BCCA 377 at para 26; R.K. HeliSki Panorama Inc. v. Jumbo Glacier Resort Project (Project Assessment Director) 2007 BCCA 9, 2007 at para 30;
Gitxaala Nation v Canada 2016 FCA 187 [Gitxaala] at para 154; Peace Valley Landowner Assn. v. Canada (Attorney
General) 2015 FC 1027 at para 68.
25
The Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal’s platitude about courts not being academies of science is
particularly relevant here: Ontario Power Generation Inc v Greenpeace Canada, 2015 FCA 186 at paras 126-130.
Inverhuron & District Ratepayers' Assn. v Canada (Minister of the Environment), 2000 CarswellNat 5474 at para 47.
But see: Pembina Institute for Appropriate Development v Canada (Attorney General), 2008 FC 302 at paras 72-73.
26
E.g. Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 129; Gagne v British Columbia (Director, Environmental
Management), 2014 BCSC 2077 at para 46; Clifford v Ontario (Attorney General), 2009 ONCA 670 at para 23;
Maritime Broadcasting System Ltd. v Canadian Media Guild, 2014 FCA 59 at para 129.
27
VAPOR v British Columbia (Environment), 2015 BCSC 1086 at para 93. Mary Liston, “Expanding the Parameters of
Participatory Public Law: A Democratic Right to Public Participation and the State’s Duty of Consultation” (2017) 63
McGill L J 275 at 411-415 [Liston, “Democracy”].
19
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These dominant judicial stances on EA legislative requirements belie the deliberative features
immanent in EA schemes. As this next part argues, deliberative EA is not simply a policy
aspiration or best practice. Deliberative EA is rather the model for exercising public authority
over the environment in a way that accords with both democratic and rule of law requirements.

B. Deliberative EA and Public Authority
Deliberation is defined as “debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable, wellinformed opinions in which participants are willing to revise preferences in light of discussion,
new information, and claims made by fellow participants.”28 Deliberation as a mode of
exchange differs from bargaining (in which parties advance purely self-interested positions) and
rhetoric, though it may involve bits of both.29 As described below, deliberation is the manner of
interaction supported by theories of deliberative democracy.30 Deliberative democrats
champion the capacity of citizens to contribute to collective decisions “at every stage of policy
formation.”31
EA scholarship contains much support for deliberative EA. Neil Craik, for example, describes
deliberative EA as
developing and inculcating shared values around environmental decisions. …The
substantive goals that underlie EIA [environmental impact assessment] are understood
to be more than symbolic and of instrumental value, since the participants are required
to justify their positions considering the available information, public comments and the
environmental objectives of EIA.32
28

Simone Chambers, “Deliberative democratic theory” (2003) 6:1 Annu Rev Political Sci 307 [Chambers] at 309.
Francesca Polletta and Beth G. Gardner, “The Forms of Deliberative Communication” in Andre Bachtiger, John
Dryzek, Jane Mansbridge and Mark Warren, The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2018) 70 at 71-2 [Polletta and Gardner].
30
Note that the focus of this article is on the potential for government-led decisions to be more in line with the
conditions of deliberative democracy. This frame of state decision-making narrows the range of deliberative
possibilities. Deliberative democrats note the radical and critical potential in deliberative democracy typically lies
outside state institutions in the public sphere.
31
Chambers, supra note 28 at 317.
32
Neil Craik, “Environmental Assessment: A Comparative Legal Analysis” in Emma Lees and Jorge E. Viñuales, eds,
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Environmental Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019) 876 [Craik,
“Comparative”] at 882. Writing about Australia, Fisher observes: “EIA was one of the tools developed to ensure
that ‘the deliberative obligation’ is discharged.” Elizabeth Fisher, Risk Regulation and Administrative
Constitutionalism, (Oxford and Portland OR: Hart Publishing, 2007) at 129 (footnotes omitted). See also: Hans
Wiklund “In search of arenas for democratic deliberation: a Habermasian review of environmental assessment”,
(2005) 23:4 Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 281; A. John Sinclair and Alan P. Diduck, “Reconceptualizing
public participation in environmental assessment as EA civics”, (2017) 62 Environ. Impact Asses. Rev. 174 at 85
[Sinclair and Diduck]; Neil Craik, “Process and Reconciliation: Integrating the Duty to Consult with Environmental
Assessment” (2016) 53 OHLJ 632 [Craik “Reconciliation”] at 673-4; Jane Holder, Environmental Assessment: The
Regulation of Decision Making (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 27-29 [Holder]; John R. Parkins,
29
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On this view, through the integration of technical expertise and community participation,
participants come to understand the significance of anticipated effects and they “may
reconsider their interests in light of both factual and normative information.”33 Many scholars
see deliberation as essential for sustainable decision making because it provides for social
learning that can dislodge unsustainable assumptions.34 Moreover, deliberative participation in
EA is understood as an exercise in citizenship, which both builds democratic capacity and
provides democratic authority to decisions with significant public impacts.35
Deliberative decision making is typically situated within theories of deliberative democracy,
which foreground public reason (rather than preference-aggregation) in democracies.36 A key
marker of deliberative democratic decision making is the giving and receiving of publicregarding reasons for public decisions.37 Thus a good outcome for public decision making, from
this perspective, is a decision that is justified through accessible and reasonable reasons to
those who are subject to its effects.38 Deliberation is a mode of decision making in which
process and substance are fused. As leading scholars of deliberative democracy put it: “What
reasons count as such a justification is inescapably a substantive question.”39
Deliberative democrats argue that deliberation enhances legitimacy, encourages publicregarding perspectives by participants, promotes mutual respect and improves the quality of
decisions.40 Building on these insights, public law scholars argue that the exercise of public
authority in a manner that accords with deliberative-democratic principles is tied to legality.41
“Deliberative Democracy, Institution Building, and the Pragmatics of Cumulative Effects Assessment” (2011) 16:3
Ecology and Society 30.
33
Craik, “Comparative,” supra note 32 at 883; Holder, supra note 32 at 28.
34
A. John Sinclair, Alan Diduck and Patricia Fitzpatrick, “Conceptualizing learning for sustainability through
environmental assessment: critical reflections on 15 years of research” (2008) 28 Environmental Impact
Assessment Review 415 at 425. Deliberative environmental decision-making outside the EA context also has
significant support: see, e.g. John S Dryzek and Jonathan Pickering, “Deliberation as a catalyst for reflexive
environmental governance” (2017) 131 Ecological Economics 353; Jenny Steele, “Participation and Deliberation in
Environmental Law: Exploring a Problem-solving Approach” (2001) 21:3 Oxf. J. Leg. Stud. 415-442.
35
Ciaran O’Fairchaeallaigh, “Public Participation and environmental impact assessment: Purposes, implications,
and lessons for public policy making”, (2010) 30:1 Environ. Impact Asses. Review. 19 at 22.
36
It contrasts with aggregative democracy, through which public decisions gain legitimacy through vote-taking or
other forms of aggregating individual preferences: Hoi Kong, “Election Law and Deliberative Democracy: Against
Deflation” (2015) 9 JPPL 35 [Kong, “Election”].
37
Jocelyn Stacey, The Constitution of the Environmental Emergency (Oxford and Portland OR: Hart Publishing,
2018), Ch. 4 [Stacey, “Emergency”].
38
A consensus-based outcome is always welcomed, but is not understood as a necessary or even likely outcome of
democratic deliberation: Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2004) at 26-29.
39
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, "Deliberative Democracy Beyond Process” (2002) 10:2 J Political Philos
153 at 156 [Gutmann and Thompson “Beyond Process”]
40
Chambers, supra note 28 at 316.
41
David Dyzenhaus, “Deliberative constitutionalism through the lens of the administrative state” in Ron Levy, Hoi
Kong, Jeff King, eds, The Cambridge Handbook of Deliberative Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ
Press, 2017) 44; Liston “Democracy”, supra note 27; Stacey “Emergency”, supra note 37.
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Deliberative decision making thus explains how the administrative state can operate with both
democratic and legal authority.
From the scholarship on deliberative democracy, we can identify three conditions that must be
met to foster deliberative decision making.42 The first condition is recognition that those
affected have the capacity to contribute to decisions affecting their interests; in other words, it
is recognition of their responsible agency.43 Individuals and communities are not passive
recipients of commands, rather they have agency with respect to collective decisions. Their
agency is respected when they can participate in the debate and discussion about decisions
that impact their interests. It is further recognized when they have opportunities to contest (or
accept) those decisions.
Second, their agency is responsible because it is exercised with an understanding of mutual
respect that flows from the act of deliberation. “To deliberate with another is to understand the
other as a self-authoring source of reasons and claims.”44 Deliberation requires participants to
be recognized and respected as free and equal participants who ought to give and are entitled
to receive public-regarding reasons, not entirely self-interested claims.45 Mutual respect
demands that deliberative forums are designed to foster free and equal participation. Scholars
have written extensively about these conditions both in an ideal form46 and in specific cases
(e.g. the design of citizen assemblies).47 Mutual respect also requires that participants conduct
themselves as responsible agents by bringing relevant, public-regarding claims. This is how
discussion remains “aimed at producing reasonable, well-informed opinions.”48
Finally, deliberative decision-making is reflexive.49 Responsible agents who respect each other
as such are willing to revise preferences. New information and different perspectives and
opinions ought to prompt participants – including decision makers – to reconsider and perhaps
revise their own opinions. The reason-giving requirement means that participants ought to be
able to articulate how they took that information into account to justify their ultimate position.
This requirement of reflexivity attaches to all participants, but it has a particular importance
42

From a design perspective these three conditions roughly map onto Fung’s cube of participation: Archon Fung,
“Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance” (2006) 66 Public Administrative Review 66.
43
Kristen Rundle, Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon L Fuller (Oxford and Portland OR: Hart
Publishing, 2012); Kong, “Election”, supra note 36 at 40. And building off these sources: Stacey, “Emergency”,
supra note 37 at 106-7.
44
Jane Mansbridge et al, “A systemic approach to deliberative democracy” in John Parkinson and Jane Mansbridge
eds, Deliberative Systems: Deliberative Democracy at the Large Scale (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2012) at 11.
45
For a summary of the literature on this point, see Polletta and Gardner, supra note 29 at 71-72. On the relevance
of this to Canadian public law see: Liston “Democracy”, supra note 27 and Stacey, “Emergency”, supra note 37.
46
Alice Woolley, “Legitimating Public Policy” (2008) 58 UTLJ 153; Henry Richardson, Democratic Autonomy: Public
Reasoning About the Ends of Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) [Woolley]; J Cohen, ‘Deliberation and
Democratic Legitimacy’ in J Bonham and W Rehg (eds), Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics
(Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1997) 73.
47
Chambers, supra note 28 at 36 (and citations therein).
48
Supra, note 28.
49
Ibid. at 308-9; Dryzek and Pickering, supra note 34.
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when dealing with the exercise of public authority. Public officials must respond through
reason-giving to the claims made by those affected. Reflexivity respects the responsible agency
of those subject to the decision.50
These conditions of deliberation thus provide an internal structure for publicly justified
decisions. In a deliberative democracy, public decision makers must seek to fulfill these
conditions in the first instance because this is the source of their democratic and legal
authority. When subject to review, courts too must attend to these conditions.51 This reconciles
democratic authority with the rule of law.52
In sum, deliberative decision making is supported as a form of best practices for EA to improve
both the legitimacy and quality of EA decisions. Deliberative EA is grounded in a theory of
public authority that explains how EA decisions made by the administrative state can fulfill both
democratic and legal requirements. Moreover, this theory can be distilled into three conditions
that are essential to allow deliberative decision-making to unfold.

II. Environmental Law’s Public Law Frames and their Deliberative
Dimensions
The duty of fairness, early Canadian EA regulation, and the DCA have independent origins but
all three inform the legislative structure and operation of modern EA law. This part explains the
connection between modern EA and each of the common law duty of fairness, early EA as
public inquiry, and the DCA. For each public law frame, it highlights how the existing doctrine
has recognized the three conditions of deliberation. While this recognition is both implicit and
incomplete, it nonetheless provides a coherent explanation of modern EA and has the potential
to significantly and explicitly inform the implementation and interpretation of modern EA law.

A. Administrative Law: The Duty of Fairness
i.

EA as Procedural Fairness for the Public

The first public law frame is the common law duty of fairness. The duty of fairness guarantees
those affected by a public decision a right to be heard by an impartial decision maker. Elizabeth
Fisher writes that EA can be understood as ensuring procedural fairness for the public:
50

Chambers, supra note 28 at 308 and 317; Gutmann and Thompson “Beyond Process”, supra note 39 at 156. See
also Genevieve Cartier, “Deliberative Ideals and Constitutionalism in the Administrative State” in Ron Levy, Hoi
Kong, Graeme Orr and Jeff King eds, The Cambridge Handbook of Deliberative Constitutionalism (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2018) 57 at 62-63.
51
This is reflected in current Canadian administrative law and its emphasis on justified administrative decisionmaking: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65. See in particular, paras 2, 14, 74.
52
David Dyzenhaus, “Law as Justification: Etienne Mureinik’s Conception of Legal Culture” (1998) 14 South African
Journal on Human Rights 11 at 36-37.

10

(2020) 43:2 Dalhousie Law Journal forthcoming

The fact that EIA [environmental impact assessment] is a legal procedure
makes it both legally familiar and legally alien. It is familiar because lawyers,
particularly administrative lawyers, are well acquainted with procedural
obligations in the form of natural justice and procedural fairness. It is alien
because most such procedural obligations are focused on protecting
individual rights while EIA is a procedure in the public interest.53
Fisher’s characterization applies in the Canadian context. While in Canada the common law
duty of fairness has not been extended to the public generally,54 the public’s right to be heard
has been a defining feature of Canadian EA since its inception.55 Canada’s first EA legislation not
only allowed for public participation, it committed the government to actively facilitating such
input.56 Every version of federal EA legislation has included “meaningful public participation” as
one of its purposes.57 For major project EAs, public participation has occurred through
opportunities for written comment at multiple points in the EA process and through intervenor
status hearings. The importance of public participation to EA is underscored by the significant
backlash to 2012 legislative changes, which for the first time curtailed the role of public input.58
Like the common law duty of fairness, the role of the public in EA is two-fold: instrumental and
intrinsic.59 First, members of the public are often the source of relevant information about the
environment and the possible impacts of an approval decision. This information can enhance,
contest, or clarify the information presented by the project proponent. NGOs and members of
the public play an essential role in contesting proponent evidence and thus provide the decision
maker with a much fuller picture of the assessment of the project’s anticipated effects.60
Second, the scale of the projects subject to EA means that members of the public are affected
53
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either directly or indirectly by these public decisions. Accordingly, EA affords them a right to be
heard prior to a decision being made that affects their interests. This is the intrinsic justification
for public participation – it recognizes the autonomy and agency of those affected.61 The
instrumental and intrinsic justifications for participation are often captured by the language of
legitimacy.62 When EA functions well through a fair process, it contributes to the legitimacy of
development project decisions. Similarly, and independent of any effect on the substantive
outcome, the duty of fairness contributes to the legitimacy of the administrative process.63
These similarities suggest that understanding EA as procedural fairness for the public is an apt
way of explaining the unusual structure of EA and the elusive content of legislative provisions
prescribing engagement with affected communities. As the next section shows, watershed
judicial decisions on the common law duty of fairness contain the deliberative conditions
delineated above.
ii.

Deliberative Conditions in the Duty of Fairness

This part examines the common law duty of fairness exemplified in the UK decision in Cooper v
Board of Works64 and the leading SCC decision in Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration).65 Cooper is an 1863 Court of Common Pleas decision that is said to foreshadow
the Canadian duty of fairness by over a century.66 In Baker, the Supreme Court of Canada
solidified the doctrine of the duty of fairness and, in doing so, supplied a remarkably stable
precedent for this area of administrative law.
The facts of Cooper are simple. The Board of Works ordered the demolition of Cooper’s
partially-built home without affording Cooper any notice or opportunity to be heard prior to
making the decision. Cooper was notified of the decision only upon discovering his demolished
home. The relevant legislation required that persons provide the Board notice prior to building
a new home; Cooper claimed he provided notice. The Board claimed that Cooper did not and,
accordingly, the legislation authorized the demolition of the home. The Court unanimously held
that Cooper was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the Board’s
demolition decision, notwithstanding the fact that the legislation was silent on the process to
be afforded to individuals. Notably, Chief Justice Erle refused to rest his judgment solely on a
characterization of the decision as “judicial.”67 It is this rejection of categorization and embrace
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of a broader notion of fairness that is said to be the precursor to the contemporary Canadian
duty of fairness.
The Chief Justice’s reasons focus on the significant power exercised by the Board and the lack of
harm that would come from the Board “hearing the party before they subjected him to a loss
so serious.”68 There is a clear connection here with the first deliberative condition: respect for
Cooper’s responsible agency. None of the judges viewed the requirement of fairness as a mere
procedural formality. Willes and Byles JJ added that the absence of notice thwarted entirely
Cooper’s ability to contest the adverse decision (prior to demolition) using the appeals
mechanisms set out in the statute.69 By denying him the opportunity to actively accept or
contest the decision, Cooper was treated as a recipient of a command and not a responsible
agent capable of participating in the decision-making process.
A closer reading of Cooper reveals the Court’s commitment to the two further conditions for
deliberation. Cooper was owed a duty of fairness because of his interests at stake and also
because he might have something relevant and useful to contribute to the decision to be made.
The judges had in mind an administrative process that fosters mutual respect. That is, they had
an expectation that both the Board and Cooper will approach the process as an opportunity for
forming reasonable positions in light of the statutory scheme. For example, the Chief Justice
speculated that perhaps “[t]he default in sending notice… is a default which may be
explained.”70 It is not simply that Cooper will assert his right or interest in his private property,
but rather that he might put forth good reasons for avoiding the demolition that are relevant to
the statutory scheme.
Krating J states this expectation even more strongly and connects it to an obligation on the part
of the Board. He suggests that if Cooper had the opportunity to assure the Board that
construction proceeded in a manner that protected the public interest, “can any one suppose
for a moment that the board would have proceeded to inflict upon the man the grievous injury
of demolishing his house?”71 Krating J articulates a commitment to reflexivity. That is, the mere
fact of Cooper’s participation in the process implies the Board’s willingness to adjust the
decision it might otherwise make in accordance with the information and views presented by
Cooper.
This closer read of Cooper suggests that the duty of fairness is not simply concerned with
protecting private rights from state interference. Rather, the duty of fairness is concerned with
good administration. The Chief Justice reasons that a common law duty of fairness is “required
by a due consideration for the public interest” and that it provides “a great many advantages
which might arise in the way of public order.”72 While Erle CJ does not explicate his meaning
here, the reasons as a whole suggest that the public interest and public order is best served
68
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through commitments to responsible agency, mutual respect, and reflexivity. On this view, the
private interests of Cooper are not pitted against the public interest in proper sewage
management and urban development. Rather, a fair process is one in which affected parties
offer public-regarding reasons to a respectful and open-minded decision maker. This
interpretation – one that contains the deliberative conditions – plausibly supplies a theory that
underpins the decision’s undefined objective of “substantial justice.”73
The principles of fairness articulated in Cooper laid largely dormant in Canadian administrative
law until the 1979 SCC decision in Nicholson v Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Police Commission,74
in which a majority of the court supplemented the narrow common law doctrine of natural
justice with a broader duty of fairness. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed Nicholson,
and the existence of the broader duty of fairness, six years later in Cardinal v Director of Kent
Institution.75
But it is the Court’s 1999 decision in Baker that is widely understood to unlock the potential of
the duty of fairness and brings Canadian law full circle to Cooper.76 The decision at issue was
the denial of Baker’s exemption from deportation requirements. Baker had been allowed to
make full written submissions to the decision maker, with supporting documentation and
assistance from legal counsel. After receiving the adverse decision, Baker’s counsel requested
reasons and received the notes of a junior immigration officer involved in the decision-making
process. The notes were riddled with stereotypes and prejudice against Baker, a Jamaican
woman with a mental health condition and children in care. The Court unanimously held that
the participatory rights afforded to Baker and her children were adequate, but that the decision
was biased.77 A majority of the Court also found the decision substantively unreasonable.78
There is abundant scholarship noting the remarkable features of the Baker decision.79 Here, I
note only two of the striking features of the majority’s reasons in Baker. First, the decision
extends procedural protections to those whose interests are affected by the decision. The Court
is clear that the duty is not solely about protecting the individual rights and liberties of those
directly subject to state action. Baker, the subject of the decision, was owed a duty of fairness,
but so were her children.80 The children’s best interests were at stake and those interests were
entitled to a full and fair consideration. Thus the decision maker was required to provide an
opportunity for the children’s views and evidence to be fully and fairly presented and to
73
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consider these submissions in making the decision.81 In this way, there are echoes of Cooper, in
that the duty of fairness is not simply about mediating the conflict between individual and
state, but rather is about ensuring a broader notion of substantial justice. The duty of fairness
goes hand-in-hand with public order because it ensures that the interests of those impacted –
whether the subject of the decision or not – are considered and taken into account. In this way,
the Court inched the common law doctrine closer to the public’s right to be heard which is
codified in EA statutes.
Second, Baker recognizes that the duty of fairness requires decision makers to offer reasons for
their decisions in a wide range of instances.82 This reason-giving requirement encapsulates the
conditions of mutual respect, responsible agency, and reflexivity. It is through giving reasons
that the decision maker shows respect for those affected by the decision; it shows that the
decision maker has taken seriously their interests; and it provides those affected the
opportunity to exercise their agency in either accepting or contesting the decision.
The reason-giving requirement erodes the distinction between procedural and substantive
justice.83 The obligation to provide reasons is a matter of procedural fairness, but is closely
linked to concerns about the substance or contents of the reasons offered in support of a
decision. The Baker majority observed that reasons can lead to better decisions by forcing the
decision maker to think through the rationale. In addition, the majority noted that reasons
facilitate judicial scrutiny.84 This proved true in Baker: the decision was found unreasonable
because the notes revealed the decision was “completely dismissive of the interests of Ms.
Baker’s children”, contrary to the statutory scheme.85
Implicit in the majority’s reasoning is concern for deliberative conditions. Baker may have made
submissions, as a responsible agent, but the hearing was not one in which she was treated with
respect. The notes demonstrated that the decision was influenced by the immigration officer’s
prejudice. Moreover, the notes revealed the absent of reflexivity, a willingness on the part of
the decision maker to be persuaded by better reason. Here, the decision advanced a
preconceived position, riddled as it was with stereotypes and prejudice. It was not responsive
to the concerns advanced by those affected.
This part has highlighted that, among many important features of Baker, the decision rearticulates a robust understanding of fairness seen in the much earlier decision in Cooper. The
duty of fairness relied upon by both courts implicitly contains conditions for deliberative
decision making. The duty of fairness requires that those impacted by the decision be treated
as responsible agents capable of participating in the decision-making and law-making process.
Respect for those affected means a “meaningful opportunity” to be heard and to have their
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claims “fully and fairly considered.”86 It also means that participants have a reciprocal
obligation to provide relevant, public-regarding reasons for their claims. Finally, respect for the
agency of those affected requires the decision maker to be reflexive, that is, open to persuasion
and responsive to the reasons advanced by those affected.

B. Regulation: Early Canadian EA
i.

EA as Public Inquiry in Miniature

Along with the common law duty of fairness, early EA regulation and practice informs our
understanding of modern EA law. One of the most significant assessments in Canadian history is
the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry. Transformative both domestically87 and internationally88
and an early precursor to modern EA and the DCA, the 1974–1977 inquiry assessed the impacts
of a proposed oil and gas corridor in Canada’s north. Justice Thomas Berger led the inquiry. As
this part shows, his innovative implementation of the inquiry influenced early Canadian EA
regulation and fulfilled the three deliberative conditions of responsible agency, mutual respect,
and reflexivity.
The Inquiry’s terms of reference mirrored the set of considerations now associated with EA.89
Berger grasped the stakes of this proposal and his mandate in leading the inquiry. “[I]mplicit in
this mandate,” Berger wrote, is that the inquiry “is not simply a debate about a gas pipeline and
an energy corridor, it is a debate about the future of the North and its peoples.”90 Given these
stakes, he described his “anxiety” to ensure “that the people of the North and all other
Canadians with an interest in the work of the Inquiry should have every opportunity to be
heard.”91 He wrote, “[w]e wished to create an Inquiry without walls.”92
Berger was empowered to hold hearings, summon witnesses, compel the production of
documents, and “to adopt such practices and procedures for all purposes of the inquiry as he
from time to time deems expedient for the proper conduct thereof.”93 But there was no specific
legislated requirement or judicial precedent for the practices and procedures that Berger
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adopted. Instead, Berger adopted innovative and celebrated methods94 following the lead of
northern communities.
In particular, the Inquiry made community participation central to the entire endeavour. The
inquiry was structured with both community hearings and formal hearings with technical
experts, and with mechanisms to ensure participants all had access to the same information.95
The two sets of hearings were run as complementary processes and given an equal role in the
inquiry.96 Berger successfully sought and implemented a funding program for those who would
make a “necessary and substantial contribution” and who would not otherwise have the
financial resources to participate.97 Moreover, the hearings travelled to the communities and
adopted informal and flexible procedures that avoided unnecessary adversarial, legal
techniques.98
The Inquiry attained another distinctive achievement: it produced a best-selling final report.99
The report details the careful attention to process and arrives at a creative compromise in its
recommendation, the clear product of the process. Berger recommended that no pipeline
should be built across the uniquely vulnerable Northern Yukon and, while it was
environmentally feasible to build a pipeline through the Mackenzie Valley, it should be
postponed for ten years to allow for the government to negotiate land claims with the
Indigenous peoples in the north.100
The Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry has remained the gold standard for assessment that
many have relied on to advocate for more inclusive and comprehensive planning processes for
land and resource decision making.101 Despite never being fully replicated, the Inquiry
influenced the structure of early Canadian EA regulation. The first federal policy on EA, the
Environmental Assessment Review Process (EARP), was issued the same year that Berger was
given his mandate. The 1974 EARP contained the objective of “giving environmental problems
the same degree of consideration as that given to economic, social, engineering and other
concerns” but it did not incorporate a significant role for public participation.102 The Inquiry,
94
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however, galvanized public interest in EA, generated criticism of the original EARP, and resulted
in policy changes. These changes emphasized the role of public participation throughout the
assessment process and strengthened the independence of public panel reviews.103
Implementation of the EARP was uneven but updates continued to strengthen its language. By
1984, when the EARP was formalized as a “Guidelines Order” (EARPGO), a legally-binding
regulation,104 it included several of Berger’s participatory innovations. EARPGO documents
emphasized the role of public participation at all stages of environmental assessment.105 Panel
reviews (what were and remain the most comprehensive form of assessment for larger
projects) were designed to make public participation central to the exercise.106 Emulating the
Inquiry’s community hearings, and the understanding that public participation must be actively
facilitated, the EARPGO required that “[a]ll hearings of a Panel shall be public hearings
conducted in a non-judicial and informal but structured manner”107 with the goal to “encourage
the broadest public participation.”108 Multiple community hearings were the norm for panel
reviews, with separate ‘issue meetings’ convened for interested parties to address specific,
controversial issues.109 Beginning in 1990, EA implementation was supported by a formalized
participant funding program with criteria for eligibility similar to the those used by Berger.110
The EARPGO, in some ways, seemed to conceive of panel reviews as miniature public inquiries.
The courts agreed that facilitating public participation was a central objective of the EA
process.111 As noted above, once federal EA was enacted as legislation, public participation was
entrenched as one of its core purposes.112 The Inquiry had made its imprint on early EA
regulation. As the next section argues, the Inquiry’s design met the three conditions of
deliberative decision making.

ii.

The Deliberative Features of the Inquiry and its Influence

Berger understood the Inquiry as an exercise in deliberative democracy, one that cultivated
social learning and shared values through the integration of robust participation and formal
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expertise. In the report, he wrote: “Commissions of Inquiry have begun to take on a new
function: that of opening up issues to public discussion, of providing a forum for the exchange
of ideas.”113 For Berger, proper process flowed from this understanding:
If commissions of inquiry have become an important means for public participation in
democratic decision-making as well as an instrument to supply informed advice to
government, it is important to consider the way in which inquiries are conducted and
whether they have the means to fulfill their perceived functions.114
Indeed, the Inquiry fulfilled the three deliberative conditions introduced above. It was a process
that treated those affected as responsible, self-determining agents, it afforded them respect
and cultivated mutual respect amongst participants, and it demonstrated reflexivity.
First, Berger’s understanding of those affected as responsible agents is demonstrated by how
he included their input into the Inquiry. The Inquiry did not passively create an opportunity for
northern participation, rather it actively facilitated that participation. It sought to meet those
affected on their terms.115 “We tried to bring the Inquiry to the people. This meant it was the
Inquiry, and the representatives of the media accompanying it – not the people of the North –
that were obliged to travel.”116 The travelling Inquiry heard anyone who wanted to be heard
and stayed in the northern communities as long as it needed to stay. The Inquiry allowed those
impacted to make submissions in their own way. It employed translators so that Indigenous
peoples could speak in their own languages. It shed unnecessarily formal and legalistic
procedures.117
Notably, this did not come at the expense of others affected by the decision. Berger recognized
the responsible agency of those in southern Canada as well. He took the view that those in the
south deserved to hear and understand the anticipated impacts on the north.118 Berger
observed, “this was a public inquiry. The things that were said were the public’s business….”119
He held hearings in the south.120 These hearings were accompanied by a sophisticated media
strategy for disseminating information about the Inquiry.121
Berger’s commitment to mutual respect was clear through his careful attentiveness to how a
“fair and complete” inquiry must enable the participation of those affected and those interests
that might not otherwise be represented.122 He sought, in other words, to ensure that those
affected were treated as free and equal. An independent committee provided scientific
113
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evidence that was available to all.123 Berger deployed non-adversarial mechanisms for
disclosure of documents so they were available to all participants.124 He provided participant
funding.125 These procedures were all essential to ensure that lay participants were on equal
terms with professionals and technical experts and to enable mutual exchange.
Berger’s insistence that “the formal hearings and the community hearings should be regarded
as equally important parts of the same process”126 nicely illustrates the commitment to mutual
respect. While the procedures for each set of hearings were tailored to the particular focus
(community knowledge and experience vs technical expertise), the two were held concurrently
and were mutually informing. Berger noted “[t]he contributions of ordinary people were…
important in the assessment of even the most technical subjects.”127 Indigenous knowledge of
the land was integral to assessing impacts on caribou, the vulnerability of the Beaufort Sea to
oil spills, and effect of frost heave on pipeline construction and operation.128 Reflecting the
generative potential of deliberation, Berger concluded: “It became increasingly obvious that the
issue of impact assessment is much greater than the sum of its constituent parts.”129
Finally, Berger’s commitment to reflexivity was demonstrated throughout his detailed report
which captured distinctive perspectives of the north as “homeland” and as “frontier”.
Reflexivity was also demonstrated through Berger’s interpretation of the Inquiry mandate to
allow for the consideration of native land claims. Early in the process the Inuit, Métis, and Dene
advanced the position that there could be no approval of a pipeline right-of-way until land
settlement agreements were concluded with the Crown.130 Berger understood this claim to be
“an essential focus for the natives’ case regarding the impact of the pipeline and their way of
life.”131 The process that he adopted was responsive to this central concern. He interpreted his
mandate to allow for consideration of whether the pipeline could be “built without prejudice to
the settlement of native land claims.”132 After hearing all the evidence, Berger concluded that it
could not and, thus, recommended a 10-year moratorium on pipeline development in the
Mackenzie Valley to allow for settlement negotiations.133
While EA legislation has changed considerably over time, the historical context of the
Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry and its influence on early EA regulatory structure helps
explain the centrality of public participation to EA and the unwavering public expectation and
demand for robust inclusion in these processes. Moreover, as we have seen, this early history
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demonstrates a real attention to the deliberative conditions of responsible agency, mutual
respect and reflexivity through innovative regulatory design.

C. Constitutional Law: The Duty to Consult and Accommodate
i.

EA as Framework for the Duty to Consult and Accommodate

The third public law frame that clarifies EA legislation is its role as one of the main statutory
regimes for implementing the DCA. While the DCA is a constitutional obligation owed by the
Crown, the SCC has readily and repeatedly endorsed the use of statutory regimes, such as EA
legislation, to fulfill this obligation to Aboriginal peoples.134 This section explains how EA and
the DCA are connected legally and in implementation.
The DCA doctrine is highly context specific, tailored to the specific impacts of specific Crown
action on specific Aboriginal peoples. It therefore has multiple legal steps. First, the Crown must
determine if the DCA is triggered. The duty is engaged “when the Crown has knowledge, real or
constructive, of the potential existence of the Aboriginal right or title and contemplates
conduct that might adversely affect it.”135 When engaged, the Crown must next determine the
scope of the duty owed. The Court describes “the scope of the duty [as] proportionate to a
preliminary assessment of the strength of the case supporting the existence of the right or title,
and to the seriousness of the potentially adverse effect upon the right or title claimed.”136 This
second step requires the Crown to conduct a strength of claim analysis and share this
information with the affected Aboriginal group.137 The third step is consultation itself, discussed
in more depth below. A minimal DCA involves Crown notice and disclosure of information,
whereas deep consultation involves robust engagement “aimed at finding a satisfactory interim
solution.”138 Finally, the Court states that in some circumstances consultation will lead to
accommodation, which requires the Crown “taking steps to avoid irreparable harm or to
minimize the effects of infringement.”139
Craik observes that there is a “pragmatic attractiveness” to treating EA and the DCA as
complementary, “since much of the information and analysis of the environmental effects of a
proposed activity will be required to assess the impacts of that same activity on Aboriginal
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rights and interests.”140 Information collected through the EA informs the Crown’s
determination of the scope of the duty, forms the basis for discussions with Aboriginal groups
during the consultation and suggests possibilities for accommodation (usually in the form of
mitigation measures.)141 Conversely, the sharing of Indigenous knowledge and expertise
through the consultation should inform the Crown’s understanding of the environmental and
social impacts of the proposed project and the application of the legal tests required under EA
legislation.142
In addition to practical overlap, EAs are themselves Crown conduct which trigger the DCA. This
is true of decisions made throughout the EA process, from high-level scoping EA decisions143 to
final decisions on project approval. It is also true of decisions made by government agencies144
as well as Ministers and Governor in Council.145 Moreover, the BC Court of Appeal has held
that, given the significance of EA decision making for land and resource management, EA must
include Aboriginal consultation, even if there is a separate process for engaging with affected
Aboriginal peoples.146 EA and the DCA are legally intertwined.147
The Crown also views these processes as necessarily interconnected, which is reflected in
federal and provincial policy guidance: “since 2006, the Government of Canada has relied, to
the extent possible, on the federal environmental assessment process to fulfill the duty to
consult and accommodate, as appropriate.”148 Canada has produced numerous policy
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documents to guide Aboriginal “participation” in EA.149 Similarly, BC policy documents presume
integration between EA and the DCA.150
The apparent complementarity between EA and DCA often breaks down in practice, however,
giving rise to complex and highly contextual disputes and legal issues. For example, despite the
Crown’s reliance on EA for DCA purposes, the process of the EA is often defined to exclude
matters of crucial import to Aboriginal peoples and the exercise of their rights.151 Aspects of the
DCA get parcelled out across government actors,152 creating tension with Aboriginal parties
who are prevented from effectively conversing with decision makers about their concerns.153
Government agencies fail to fulfill the DCA because they confuse essential distinctions between
environmental impacts and impacts on Aboriginal rights.154 And ambiguity remains over
whether Aboriginal groups, government, or industry proponents bear the onus of
substantiating concerns about anticipated environmental impacts which impinge proven or
claimed Aboriginal or treaty rights.155
The on-the-ground operation of EA as a framework for the DCA is highly complex and often
fraught. As we see in the next section, the courts have nonetheless developed and enforced a
set of legal obligations governing the exercise of public authority in these contexts. Moreover,
the judicially-developed DCA recognizes – albeit incompletely – the three conditions of
deliberative decision making.
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ii.

The Deliberative Features of the Duty to Consult and Accommodate

This section identifies the strongest attributes of the DCA and their deliberative potential, while
recognizing that, even in its best light, the DCA is highly constrained.156 Indeed the close
connection between EA and the DCA in practice may contribute to the DCA’s narrowness.
When combined with EA, affected Aboriginal and treaty rights are framed as simply as another
set of inputs into the assessment, rather than the impetus for coproduction of knowledge and
shared decision making. EA thus helps to position the DCA alongside the other two public law
frames as a decision-making procedure within Canadian public law, rather than as a rightsaffirming doctrine with the potential to mediate across legal orders.157
It is possible, nonetheless, to see the courts articulating and actively developing deliberative
conditions in the DCA doctrine, even though, as we will see, they often stop well short of giving
them full effect. This section draws out those deliberative conditions from the SCC’s formative
decision in Haida and surrounding DCA jurisprudence. In addition, it highlights an example of
how these deliberative conditions have been misunderstood by the courts. This example
underscores the importance of making explicit the conditions on which the court relies to guide
its understanding of DCA.
The Court’s description of consultation shares the basic features of deliberation introduced in
Part I. Haida defines consultation in the following terms: “‘[C]onsultation’ in its least technical
definition is talking together for mutual understanding”.158 The Court adopts from New Zealand
policy the idea that “[c]onsultation is not just a process of exchanging information. It also
entails testing and being prepared to amend policy proposals in the light of information
received, and providing feedback.”159 It describes a reciprocal relationship in which participants
engage in a search for a reasonable outcome that takes into account the reasons and views of
each other. Consultation, as described in Haida, is not a one-way transfer of information from
one party to another. Nor is it a straight-forward balancing of fixed preferences of the
participants. Rather consultation, on this view, is potentially transformative, where the
outcomes generated from the consultation are a unique product of the process.160
The deliberative condition of responsible agency is encapsulated by the Crown’s obligation to
consult with Aboriginal participants in their unique capacity as claimants of Aboriginal and
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treaty rights.161 The DCA cannot be fulfilled by treating Aboriginal participants simply as
another stakeholder in a decision with broader public consequences. Haida clarifies that
Aboriginal peoples are entitled to a decision-making process that is distinctive from what the
ordinary duty of fairness requires and that may generate different outcomes than ordinary
equitable remedies such as interim injunctions.162 This flows from the distinctive stakes in land
and resource decisions for Aboriginal peoples.163 This distinctiveness is again recognized by the
Court when it holds that fulfilling the duty to consult “is a special public interest that
supersedes other concerns.”164
The commitment to mutual respect between Crown and Aboriginal participants flows from the
honour of the Crown.165 At its core, the honour of the Crown seems to entail a stance of respect
for Indigenous peoples in Canada.166 For example, communication by the Crown to Aboriginal
peoples must foster mutual understanding.167 Respect is also required in that the Crown has a
clear and legally-enforceable obligation to conduct a strength of claim analysis and to share
that information with the affected Aboriginal group.168 The strength of claim analysis ensures
that Crown consultation is tailored to the specific impacts on the individual Aboriginal group.
Sharing that information creates the platform for fostering dialogue, recognized within the
existing doctrinal frame.169
Moreover, Haida is clear that this respect must be mutual: “At all stages, good faith on both
sides is required.”170 Hard bargaining is acceptable, according to the Court, when it takes place
within the broader understanding of reconciliation and the honour of the Crown. The vision
presented by the Court reflects deliberative theories which value plural modes of reason giving
and moments of bargaining or rhetoric, provided they take place within a broader commitment
of the parties to deliberative democracy.171
Implicit in the Haida definition of consultation is the condition of reflexivity. Because
consultation is not simply the exchange of information or, as the Court later states, “an
opportunity to blow off steam,”172 there is an obligation on Crown decision makers to revise
decisions in light of the consultation process. For deep consultation, the Federal Court of
Appeal has stated that “a dialogue must ensue and the dialogue should lead to a demonstrably
serious consideration of accommodation. The Crown must be prepared to make changes to its
161

Haida, supra note 7 at para 51; Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2005 SCC
69 [Mikisew] at para 64.
162
Haida, supra note 7 at para 13.
163
Ibid. at para 7.
164
CR, supra note 14 at para 40.
165
Newman, supra, note 139 at 27-28.
166
Ibid. 139 at 167.
167
CR, supra note 14 at para 49.
168
Supra note 137.
169
Gitxaala, supra note 24 at paras 308-9.
170
Haida, supra note 7 at para 42.
171
Chambers, supra note 28 at 309, 322.
172
Mikisew, supra note 161 at para 54.

25

(2020) 43:2 Dalhousie Law Journal forthcoming
proposed actions”.173 While Haida is clear that consultative obligations are varied and that the
requirement of accommodation may not always arise, it is equally clear that the “common
thread on the Crown’s part must be ‘the intention of substantially addressing [Aboriginal]
concerns’ as they are raised … through a meaningful process of consultation.”174
Reflexivity is further presumed in judicial decisions that require consultation at the stage that
can actually influence the outcome. In Haida, the Court determined that “to be meaningful”,
consultation must take place on higher-level, strategic decisions which set the course for
subsequent operational decisions.175 At least for major projects, this has been extended to
consultation on the macro-level design of the EA process itself.176 Furthermore, the Court has
recognized that early consultation is essential, otherwise “there is clear momentum to allow a
project.”177
The condition of reflexivity is enforced through the obligation to give reasons for the decision.
Reason giving is a crucial expression of respect for the receiving party, which has added
significance in the Crown’s process of reconciliation. As the Supreme Court has stated:
Written reasons foster reconciliation by showing affected Indigenous peoples that their
rights were considered and addressed… Reasons are “a sign of respect [which] displays
the requisite comity and courtesy becoming the Crown as Sovereign toward a prior
occupying nation”… Written reasons also promote better decision making...178
The Court ends this passage with a nod to the internal substantive constraints of reason giving.
Not just any reasons will fulfill the Crown’s obligations. The courts have held in this context that
reasons must show that “representations are seriously considered and, wherever possible,
demonstrably integrated into the proposed plan of action”.179 An obligation to show that the
concerns of Indigenous nations have been integrated into the decision provides at least a
baseline substantive test for the DCA.180 Demonstrable integration is consistent with the
dialogic nature of consultation that the Court in Haida seems to have in mind and that is picked
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up explicitly in later decisions by the Federal Court of Appeal, which demand of the Crown
responsive reasons.181 At its best, the DCA encapsulates the three deliberative conditions and,
like deliberative decision making, fuses procedural and substantive demands.182
While the three deliberative conditions are immanent in DCA jurisprudence, they are
imperfectly realized.183 For example, the courts repeatedly invoke the statement that
consultation does not create “a veto over what can be done with land.”184 In this way the DCA
mirrors the common law duty of fairness and the distinction between process and substance
sustained in the common law.185
The deliberative conditions indicate that the veto language is inappropriate. While it is true that
deliberative decision making means no one substantive outcome can be presupposed in
advance,186 it is inaccurate to describe this as a veto. Rather it is a deliberative constraint that
applies to all participants in the decision-making process, including the Crown. It is thus
important for the Courts to distinguish between general deliberative conditions and the specific
case. A deliberative understanding of the DCA likely requires the outcome in some specific
instances to resemble a veto in that the deliberative process results in the Crown adopting an
Aboriginal participant’s position whole cloth. In such a case, as Christie puts it, this “may appear
to the observer that Aboriginal nations are exercising veto powers, [but] what is actually
transpiring is the restraint of Crown power”.187 Attending to these deliberative conditions
means that the Crown must be prepared to reject some major projects, at least in some
instances, where the concerns of Aboriginal participants are so serious as to persuade the
Crown to change its position. And the Crown must be open to such persuasion.188
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This part has shown that this restraint of Crown power flows from the deliberative conditions
contained elsewhere in the DCA. As discussed in Part I, these deliberative conditions are
grounded in a theory that explains how the exercise of public power can have legal and
democratic authority within the Canadian legal system.189 Making explicit the implicit
deliberative conditions contained in the DCA would allow courts to give full effect to the DCA.
This part has clarified EA law using three public law frames: EA as procedural fairness for the
public, EA as public inquiry and EA as framework for the DCA. In addition, it has argued that
these three public law frames contain three essential conditions for deliberative decisionmaking. While implicit and not always fully realized, each of these areas of public law
nonetheless recognizes the responsible agency of those affected, seeks to foster mutual
respect, and requires reflexivity. Elucidating these three shared deliberative conditions explains
how the deliberative aspirations of EA are immanent in the public law backdrop which informs
its modern legislative form.

III. Modern Environmental Assessment Law Reform
Reforms to BC and Canada’s EA legislation underscore the need to clarify the public law context
of EA law. Features such as a planning phase, incorporation of community knowledge, and the
recognition of Indigenous jurisdiction all have the potential to move EA in Canada toward the
deliberative model long-supported by EA research. However, these legislative reforms are not
straight-forward; they do not simply codify pre-existing government obligations to engage with
those affected by EA decisions. There is a risk that the important public law connections
detailed in Part II will be obscured. To counter this risk, this part provides a brief example of a
new EA reform to show how EA as procedural fairness, EA as public inquiry in miniature, and EA
as DCA framework are merged and extended through this reform. It then identifies the role that
shared deliberative conditions can and should play in provided a clear and coherent baseline for
the implementation and interpretation of EA reforms.
BC and Canada’s EA legislation now contain a “planning phase”190 or “early engagement
stage,”191 which begins as soon as the EA requirements of the legislation are triggered by the
proponent’s application. Planning and early engagement effectively create participatory
processes for determining the process. It provides for input from local communities, other
jurisdictions (Indigenous and non-Indigenous), and the public broadly on both the project
design and the content of the EA before the assessment is undertaken. It precedes the actual
189
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assessment and ends with a determination of whether the proposed project should be
exempted from an EA, rejected outright, or subject to an EA. In BC, this is one of two points in
the EA regime in which the Agency is required to seek the consent of participating Indigenous
nations.192
The inclusion of mandatory planning and early engagement is a move toward best practices.193
Early input allows those affected to shape the substantive concerns to be addressed in the
assessment as well as how they will be addressed (e.g. modes of continued engagement
through the EA process and monitoring). Planning and early engagement allow for mutual
learning between proponent, communities, and government before positions on specific issues
become entrenched. They create opportunities for both the EA and the final decision to
respond fully to concerns brought forward early in the process.
In addition to EA best practice, planning and early engagement can also be understood as an
instantiation of the three public law frames described above. First, like the common law duty of
fairness, planning and early engagement guarantees those affected a right to be heard with
“full and fair consideration”194 of their concerns. But it also extends on the Baker requirement
of “full and fair consideration” by ensuring that concerns are heard well before the EA and its
final decision gain too much momentum for those concerns to be taken seriously.
Second, the planning and early engagement reforms emulate the model of the Mackenzie
Valley Pipeline Inquiry, which included early engagement while also being flexible in the form of
that engagement. Canada and BC’s reforms make this early stage of EA a requirement. The lack
of legal specification for the content of planning and early engagement creates a real risk of
minimalist and ineffective engagement. But, like the Inquiry, it also creates the opportunity for
Agency leadership to require creative and deliberative early engagement that is responsive to
local needs. As the Inquiry demonstrates early engagement allows decision makers to craft an
assessment process that is responsive to the pressing concerns of local communities both in
terms of substance (e.g. title and land negotiations) and process (e.g. informal and inclusive
community hearings).
Finally, planning and early engagement are crucial parts of how the DCA will be operationalized
for major project decisions. Canada’s interim guidelines outline a collaborative and consentseeking approach with Indigenous Nations for the planning phase. One outcome of this stage is
a collaboratively-designed Indigenous Engagement and Partnership Plan which outlines
participation, collaboration, and partnership arrangements between Canada and affected
Indigenous peoples.195 BC’s EAA also empowers the Agency to conclude partnership
agreements with affected Indigenous nations.196 But the provincial legislation also clearly
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moves the Agency beyond the constitutional minimum set out in the DCA with its consentseeking mandate and specific requirements to secure the consent of participating Indigenous
Nations.197 Planning and early engagement thus seem to incorporate and potentially surpass
the strongest aspects of the existing DCA by requiring dialogue and meaningful engagement on
these strategic decisions about the nature of consultation itself. Moreover, the outcome of the
planning and early engagement stage is a set of reasons that demonstrates how consensus was
sought, and ideally achieved, for the EA process going forward.
In sum, planning and early engagement features in the reformed EA legislation extend and
merge aspects of the duty of fairness, regulatory practice, and the DCA. This means that each of
these public law frames is, on its own, inadequate for interpreting the legal scope of these new
design features. Yet the deliberative conditions shared across these three public law frames
have the potential to guide interpretation and implementation in a way that helps modern EA
law better achieve its deliberative potential.
The specific, nuanced requirements of these conditions must be worked out in light of the
particularities of each case. But the deliberative conditions ought to prompt several questions
about the administration of the planning or early engagement stage. For example, did this stage
provide an inclusive opportunity for those who are affected to exercise their agency? As the
three public law frames demonstrate, recognizing the responsible agency of those affected
means treating engagement as a central part of the public decision-making process, not a
formality or one of many inputs into a decision-making calculus.
Second, was this a planning process that was appropriately facilitative of the agency of those
affected? That is, did it create fair and equal conditions for engagement by those affected? The
three public law frames demonstrate attention to the conditions for participation. Mutual
respect means participants and decision makers alike must approach the process in the spirit of
understanding, free from bias and stereotypes. 198 It means attention to the different abilities of
those affected to engage (e.g. timing and funding needs) and the different ways in which
concerns will be communicated.
Finally, did planning and early engagement culminate in a decision that was responsive to
reasons presented during this stage? Again, the three public law frames demonstrate that
reflexivity and, in particular, the provision of responsive and public-regarding reasons by the
decision maker are a condition of the legitimate exercise of public authority. Reflexive reasons
197
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have particular importance early in the EA, since their absence is likely to brew resentment and
a lack of trust for those affected by the final decision.

Conclusion
This article has argued that the deliberative aspirations for EA are sourced in law. Contrary to
dominant legal characterizations as essentially technical or essentially political, this article has
clarified that EA legislation can be explained through three public law frames. Understanding EA
as procedural fairness for the public, public inquiry in miniature, and as a framework for
implementing the DCA clarifies its long-standing objective of ensuring meaningful engagement
with those affected by EA decisions. Moreover, a close analysis of the duty of fairness, the
influence of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry, and the DCA has revealed they contain three
essential deliberative conditions. Each recognizes the responsible agency of those affected by
public decisions, each fosters mutual respect, and each commits participants and decision
makers to reflexivity. These conditions are part of a broader theory of public authority that is
realized (in part) through these three areas of public law.
The implications of this article are both general and specific. The general implication of this
article has been to show the mutually-informing potential of environmental law and public law
theory and doctrine. As a pillar of environmental law and the only consistent point of
transparent and participatory environmental decision making across Canada, EA law must be
informed by general public law requirements. Conversely, as a site of recent and innovative law
reform, the novel design features in of EA legislation ought to illuminate the creative and
deliberative potential laden in the public law doctrine.
The article’s specific contributions have been to clarify the complex characteristics of EA law
through the use of three more familiar public law frames and to show that these public law
frameworks support deliberative EA in law, not just as policy aspiration. This public law
clarification of EA further helps to supply an interpretive framework for novel design features
enacted by Canada and BC. The argument of this article is that modern EA provisions must be
implemented and interpreted in a manner that attends to the responsible agency of those
affected, the conditions for mutual respect, and the obligation of reflexivity. In this way, EA law
can ensure that consequential decisions about the future of human and ecological communities
fulfill the deliberative commitments immanent in Canadian public law.
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